ABSTRACT: In this work, a moment-independent Sensitivity Analysis (SA) based on Hellinger distance and Kullback-Leibler divergence is proposed to identify the component of a system most affecting its reliability. This result is used to adequately allocate modeling efforts on the most important component that, therefore, deserves a component-level Multi-State Physics Modeling (MSPM) to be integrated into a system-level model, to estimate the system failure probability. A Reactor Protection System (RPS) of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is considered as case study, wherein the embedded Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) is identified as the most important component. Results show the benefits of using MSPM to model the RTD with respect to a Markov Chain Model (MCM), because the former gives due account to the aging-and environmental-dependent phenomena that affect the transition rates of the system-level degradation model. In conclusion, the proposed RPS-MSPM can be seen as a trade-off model leveraging accuracy and computational demand.
INTRODUCTION
Multi-State Physics Modeling (MSPM) is a semiMarkov modeling approach that can be used in componentor/and system-level reliability assessment, for accounting for the effects of both the stochastic degradation process and the uncertain environmental and operational parameters Lin et al., 2015; Zio, 2016) . MSPM offers the possibility of embedding the physical degradation process into the assessment (Wang et al., 2016) .
However, this entails demanding efforts for modeling the physical relationships needed to build the physics-based models and high computational burden for manipulating the large amount of data, especially when treating their uncertainties (Aldemir, 2013; Zio, 2014) . As a result, a trade-off choice between modeling accuracy and computational demand is needed for practical reliability assessment based on MSPM of a complex system. In this study, Sensitivity Analysis (SA) is proposed for the assessment of a MSPM, to help the analyst to identify the components of a system that most deserve accurate modeling of aging-and environmental-dependent transition rates, for accurate system reliability assessment. The SA is performed based on moment-independent sensitivity measures, such as Hellinger distance and KullbackLeibler divergence (Diaconis et al., 1982; Gibbs et al., 2002; Di Maio et al., 2014) .
In what follows, Section 2 describes the Reactor Protection System (RPS) of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) taken as case study, and its Markov Chain Model (MCM) reliability model taken as reference model. In Section 3, SA in the MCM is performed and the Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) is identified as the component most affecting the RPS reliability. Section 4, then, shows the best trade-off MSPM model for the system dynamic reliability assessment of the RPS and, in Section 5, some conclusions are drawn.
THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
The objective of RPS is to trigger the NPP emergency shutdown, as soon as an anomaly is detected in the measurements of a relevant signal (here taken to be a temperature signal). As shown in Figure 1 , the RPS considered is composed of two redundant channels (A and B). Each channel consists of one signal sensor (S-A and S-B), one Bistable Processor Logic (BPL) subsystem (BPL-A and BPL-B), and one Local Coincidence Logic (LCL) subsystem (LCL-A and LCL-B). It is worth mentioning that given the important role that RTDs play in NPPs digital Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems (Hashemian, 2011; Yun et al., 2012; Baraldi et al., 2015) , we assume S-A and S-B of Figure 1 to be RTDs. If any of the two redundant measured signals exceeds a triggering threshold value, a Partial Tripping Signal (PTS) is sent to the corresponding BPL. The signal processing proceeds only if both channels produce the PTS: each PTS from a BPL is sent to both LCL-A and LCL-B, which process information by an "AND" gate. In other words, an Emergency Shutdown Signal (ESS) is produced only when receiving two PTSs from different BPLs; ESSs, then, activates the Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB), when at least one ESS is triggered, i.e., the information is processed by an "OR" gate. Once the RTB is activated, the power supply system and Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM), which are connected with the RTB come into use to control the power of the reactor. (Wang et al., 2015) According to the RPS scheme reported in Figure  1 , three modules are identified:  The BPL Module consists of two groups of components: each one being the series of one sensor and BPL (i.e., "S-A and BPL-A" and "S-B and BPL-B").  The LCL Module consists of the two LCLs (i.e., LCL-A and LCL-B). Since the ESS is triggered only when both LCLs simultaneously receive two PTSs from the two BPLs, this module is highly dependent on the BPL module.  The RTB Module.
The RPS-MCM
In this Section, a MCM model is proposed as reference model for the reliability assessment of the RPS. To do this, intra-and inter-module states leading to the system failure are to be identified and modeled. Intra-module states refer to the possible states of the components belonging to the same module, whereas, inter-modules states refer to the states that affect simultaneously components of different modules. Figure 2 shows the RPS-MCM, whose states are listed in Table 1 Table 2 .  Repair rates are assumed to be equal to 0. Either one or the other LCL fails to produce the ESS. 4 RTB fails during operation. 5
One LCL has failed and, then, one sensor fails. 6
One LCL has failed and, then, one BPL fails. 7
Both LCLs fail to produce the ESS. 8
One LCL has failed and, then, the RTB fails. 9
Common cause failure of BPL-A and BPL-B. 10
Common cause failure of LCL-A and LCL-B. 11 RPS failure state. 
By the MCM quantitative analysis, the RPS unreliability P(t), its modules unreliabilities PBPL(t), PLCL(t), PRTB(t), and PInter-modules(t) are quantified (Figure 3)
. A visual analysis of the unreliability curves shows that most of the system unreliability P(t) is contributed by the BPL, that is to say, the absorbing states of the BPL module most contribute to the system unreliability. 
The SA approach
The purpose of the analysis is the identification of the component contributing with the largest fraction to the system unreliability. The SA is performed as follows: 1) Calculate a moment-independent measure of the sensitivity of the unreliability P(t) to the unreliability of its i-th single contributor Pi(t) (i.e.,
PBPL(t), PLCL(t), PRTB(t) and PInter-modules(t))
, to identify the most relevant module in the system; 2) Calculate the moment-independent measure for the sensitivity between the module unreliability Pi(t) and the unreliability of its j-th embedded component Pj(t), to identify the component most affecting the module unreliability. The moment-independent sensitivity measures here adopted are the Hellinger distance and Kullback-Leibler divergence (Diaconis et al., 1982; Gibbs et al., 2002; Di Maio et al., 2014) . In detail, the Hellinger distance of Hi [p(t),pi(t) ] measures the difference between the pdf p(t) of the system unreliability P(t) and the pdf pi(t) of the i-th contributor to the system failure, i.e., BPL, LCL, RTB, Inter-modules, as follows (Diaconis et al., 1982; Gibbs et al., 2002) :
where the i-th contributor is important if Hi is small. On the other hand, the Kullback-Leibler divergence KLi[p(t),pi(t) ] measures the different information carried by the pdf p(t) of the system failure and the pdf pi(t) of the i-th contributor as follows (Diaconis et al., 1982; Gibbs et al., 2002) :
with values in [0, +  ]. In practical cases, the symmetric form of Kullback-Leibler divergence can be utilized as follows (Kullback et al., 1951) : 
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where the i-th contributor is important if KLsym,i is small, in relative terms. Since the BPL module plays the most significant role in affecting the reliability of the RPS, we now focus on identifying the BPL-embedded component most contributing to its failure. Figure 6 shows the unreliability of the BPL module and of the components therein embedded (i.e., PS(t) for the sensor and PB(t) for the BPL-component). To rank the importance of the j-th component embedded in the BPL module, the two SA measures of Eqs. (1) and (3) are quantified. The sensors turn out to be the most important components contributing to the BPL module unreliability (see Table 4 , Figures 7 and 8) . 
Results

THE SYSTEM-LEVEL MSPM
The results of the SA performed in Section 3 point at RTD as deserving more efforts accurate modeling for the RPS unreliability estimation. A componentlevel MSPM approach is here developed to describe the RTD degradation-to-failure process. The resulting model can be integrated into a system-level MSPM of the RPS, to estimate the system failure probability accounting for both aging-and environmental-dependent transition rates of the RTD (thus, embedding more knowledge into the modeling of the most important contributor to the RPS unreliability). Results are compared with those from the RPS-MCM.
The RTD-MSPM
Among the RTDs failure modes (e.g., bias, drift, performance degradation, freezing and calibration error), experimental evidence suggests that the main failure mode is drift (Balaban et al., 2009) . Drift is measured by the response time τ that the RTD needs to reach 63.2% of a sudden temperature change of the RTD. Aging t and the air gap size δ between the bottom of the thermowell and the sensing tip (that changes because of contamination and mechanical shocks) are the most likely contributors to the drift (Hashemian, 2011) . Therefore, the response time τ(t,δ) is assumed not to exceed a RTD failure threshold γY during normal operation and the RTD failure boundary is defined as
The RTD-MSPM shown in Figure 9 depicts, in a two-state diagram, the partition by F  of the safe domain S from the failure domain F of the RTD. The RTD-MSPM assumptions are described as follows: To estimate the transition rates, we build the empirical relationship plotted in Figure 10 between τ, t and δ based on the experimental data listed in Tables 5 and 6 (Hashemian, 2011; Yun et al., 2012) . For further details on the empirical model, the interested the reader may refer to (Wang et al., 2016) . Table 5 . Experimental data for τ at fixed t and δ=0 (Yun et al., 2012) Table 6 . Experimental data for τ at t=0 and fixed δ (Hashemian, 2011; Yun et al., 2012) Monte Carlo (MC) simulation is used to simulate the stochastic evolution of τ, when the relationship between τ, t and δ is taken as the one plotted in Figure 10 . The cumulative distribution function (cdf) PS(t|δ) can, thus, be estimated as the probability of τ (t,δ) to exceed γY at a given time t, based on the batch of MC simulations that have been run. Figures 11 and 12 show the λS(t|δ) and PS(t|δ) obtained from RTD-MSPM, compared with λS of Table 1 and PS(t) of the MCM of Figure 6 . It is worth noticing that λS(t|δ) of Figure 11 shows the typical infant mortality and wear out periods, and tends to be constant in the RTD useful life, which coincides with a general bath-tub curve hypothesis. In Figure 12 the PS(t|δ) is close to the PS(t) which, however, overestimates the unreliability of the RTD. The degradation process model in the MSPM is more realistic than in MCM, and on the other hand, the latter is not able to guarantee the drift onset beyond a threshold value (especially at low aging). 
The system-level RPS-MSPM
The system-level RPS-MSPM model of Figure 13 enriches the RPS-MCM model of Figure 2 by embedding the RTD-MSPM model of Figure 9 , whereas components other than the RTD are assumed to obey binary behaviors as in the reference MCM. It is worth pointing out the use of λS(t|δ) as the aging-and environmental-dependent transition rate of the RTD from functioning state to any of the state of the diagram that entails its involvement (i.e., states 0 to 1, and 3 to 5). The cdf P(t|δ) (i.e., the RPS system unreliability when aging and factors affecting the degradation of the RTD are considered) can be estimated by resorting to a two-loop MC simulation (Wang et al., 2016) . In few words, the inner loop estimates the RTD failure time, by accounting for both stochastic (the air gap size between the sensing element tip and the thermowell bottom) and deterministic (the RTD age) processes, as described in Section 4.1, whereas the outer loop implements a crude direct Monte Carlo simulation (Zio, 2013) to build the P(t|δ), by sampling all the component failure times from the respective probability distributions. Figure 14 shows the comparison between P(t|δ) of the RPS-MSPM and P(t) of the RPS-MCM. With the integration of the MSPM of the most affecting component, overestimation of the system unreliability is reduced, so that over-conservatism of reactor design and over-demand of inspection and maintenance can be effectively avoided, especially at the early stage of the system life. In this study, a SA has been performed to find the most important module and the most affecting component in the module. This provides the indication to the analyst of which components deserves more accurate modeling, according to their contribution to the system unreliability.
The case study shows that, once the most important component is identified, the additional modeling effort to build its component-level MSPM is paid back by the effective reduction of the overestimation of the system unreliability, compared to the MCM binary-states system-level modeling, supporting the system-level MSPM as an adequate model with controlled computation demand.
